Central bank independence

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Wikipedia

Octavian Armașu, NBM gorvernor, whose dismissal in 2023 raised concerns over central bank independence in Moldova[1][2][3]

Central bank independence refers to the degree of autonomy and freedom a central bank has in conducting its monetary policy and managing the financial system and inflation targeting. The purpose of central bank independence is to maintain price stability, enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy, and ensure the stability of the financial system. Independent central banks have more credible and effective commitments to price stability.[4] It is a key aspect of modern central banking, and has its roots in the recognition that monetary policy decisions should be based on the best interests of the economy as a whole, rather than being influenced by short-term political considerations.[5]

History

Early concepts (1920s)

The concept of central bank independence emerged in the 1920s[6][7] following the economic disruptions of World War I.[8] The Brussels International Financial Conference (1920) was instrumental in establishing the theoretical framework for independent central banking,[9] recognizing that monetary authorities needed autonomy to maintain financial stability.[10]

Post-World War II era

The 1951 Accord between the Federal Reserve and the United States Department of the Treasury marked a significant policy shift.[11] This agreement formally granted the Federal Reserve independence from the Treasury Department,[12] allowing it to pursue monetary policy objectives without direct government interference.[13]

Modern era (1980s-present)

Since the 1980s, there has been a substantial increase in central bank independence worldwide.[7] This movement was driven by experiences with high inflation in the 1970s[14] and a growing academic consensus on the benefits of independent monetary policy until the 2008 financial crisis.[15] Many countries reformed their central banking laws to enhance institutional independence and establish clear mandates focused on price stability.[16]

Types

Formal vs. actual independence

Formal independence refers to the legal and institutional provisions that grant autonomy to central banks, including:

  • Statutory mandates and objectives[17]
  • Organizational structure and governance[18]
  • Appointment procedures for leadership[19]
  • Budget autonomy[20]
  • Legal protection from government interference[21]

Actual independence describes the practical autonomy exercised by central banks, considering:[22]

Functional categories

Central bank independence has several dimensions:

Goal independence: The ability to set monetary policy objectives, such as inflation targets and target horizon.[28]

Instrument independence: The freedom to choose operational targets, such as interest rate, exchange rate, and credit restriction controls.[29]

Personal independence: Protection for central bank officials from arbitrary dismissal and clear appointment procedures.[28]

Financial independence: Control over its budget and access to adequate resources.[28]

Mechanisms and institutions

Governance structures

Independent central banks typically feature:

  • Fixed terms for governors and board members[30]
  • Staggered appointments to ensure continuity[31]
  • Clear dismissal procedures requiring cause[32]
  • Transparent in monetary policy conduct[33]
  • Public communication of the direction of policy operations[34]

Most independent central banks operate under specific legislation that:

  • Defines the bank's mandate and objectives[35]
  • Establishes operational autonomy[36]
  • Provides legal provisions to minimize political interference[37]
  • Sets accountability and reporting requirements[38]
  • Outlines the relationship with fiscal authorities[39]

Criticisms and limitations

Democratic accountability

Critics argue that central bank independence may conflict with democratic principles by:

  • Removing important economic decisions from elected officials[40]
  • Creating unaccountable technocratic institutions[41]
  • Potentially favoring certain economic interests over others[42]

Practical constraints

Even independent central banks face limitations:

  • Coordination challenges with fiscal policy[43]
  • Political pressure during economic crises[44]
  • Limited effectiveness during financial emergencies[45]
  • Potential conflicts between multiple mandates[46]

Global examples

High independence

Federal Reserve (United States): Features both formal and actual independence[47] with a dual mandate for price stability and full employment.[48]

European Central Bank: Designed with extensive independence provisions and a primary mandate for price stability across the Eurozone.[49]

Bank of England: Granted operational independence in 1997 with inflation targeting responsibilities.[50]

Limited independence

People's Bank of China: The People's Bank of China is an example of a central bank subject to Chinese Communist Party control (Unified power).[51]

Central banks in developing countries: In most developing countries, there is a blend of independence indicators.[52]

Another common classification of central bank independence is based on the extent to which the central bank is free from government control. This can be either formal or actual, and ranges from complete independence to full government control, with several intermediate levels in between.[53]

Commercial bank money creation and central bank independence

Money creation process

Commercial banks create money through the fractional-reserve banking system, where they hold only a fraction of deposits as reserves, meaning deposits exceed reserves.[54]

Credit creation mechanism

When commercial banks issue loans, they simultaneously create new deposits in the borrower's account, effectively creating new money.[55] This endogenous money creation process means that the majority of money in circulation is created by commercial banks rather than central banks.[56]

Regulatory framework and central bank control

Capital adequacy standards

Basel III and other international banking standards require banks to maintain capital ratios, limiting their ability to create money through excessive lending.[57] These prudential regulations work alongside central bank independence to maintain financial stability while allowing market-driven credit allocation.[58]

Prudential Supervision

Independent central banks may serve as banking supervisors, monitoring commercial banks' money creation activities to prevent excessive risk-taking and maintain systemic stability.[59] This supervisory role reinforces the importance of central bank independence in maintaining both price and financial stability.[60]

Implications for monetary policy

Policy transmission mechanisms

Central bank independence becomes particularly crucial when considering how monetary policy affects commercial bank money creation. [61] Independent central banks can adjust policy rates, reserve requirements, and quantitative easing programs without political interference, ensuring effective transmission of monetary policy through the banking system.[62]

Credit cycles and macroprudential policy

The interaction between central bank policy and commercial bank money creation can lead to credit cycles that may conflict with political preferences.[63] Independent central banks can implement countercyclical macroprudential policies to moderate excessive credit creation during boom periods, even when such policies may be politically unpopular.[64]

On 15 July 2025, Donald Trump reportedly penned a letter to dismiss Powell as Fed Chair.[65] However, Trump later denied those reports to reporters at the White House. [66]

See also

Further reading

  • Cukierman, Alex (1992). Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  • Alesina, Alberto; Summers, Lawrence H. (1993). "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence". Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 25(2): 151–162.
  • Grilli, Vittorio; Masciandaro, Donato; Tabellini, Guido (1991). "Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries". Economic Policy 6(13): 341–392.
  • Debelle, Guy; Fischer, Stanley (1994). "How Independent Should a Central Bank Be?" in Goals, Guidelines, and Constraints Facing Monetary Policymakers. Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, pp. 195–225.
  • Crowe, Christopher; Meade, Ellen E. (2008). "Central bank independence and transparency: Evolution and effectiveness". European Journal of Political Economy 24(4): 763–777.
  • Epstein, Gerald A., ed. (2019). The Political Economy of Central Banking: Contested Control and the Power of Finance. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

References

  1. ↑ Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation of macro-financial assistance to third countries in 2023. 2024. p. 5.
  2. ↑ https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/858717b3-f8ef-4514-89fe-54a6aa15ef69_en?filename=Moldova%20Report%202024.pdf page 49 "However, the abrupt dismissal of the governor of the National Bank of Moldova in December 2023 raised concerns regarding good economic governance and the independence of the central bank. The dismissal was conducted in line with Moldovan law, though this falls short of international best practice."
  3. ↑ International Monetary Fund (2024). Country reports: Republic of Moldova. p. 6. ISBN 9798400297151.
  4. ↑ Herrmann, Heinz (2 June 2009). Monetary Policy Over Fifty Years: Experiences and Lessons. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-134-02083-6.
  5. ↑ "Central Bank Accountability, Independence, and Transparency". IMF. 25 November 2019. Retrieved 13 February 2023.
  6. ↑ do Vale, Adriano (3 September 2021). "Central bank independence, a not so new idea in the history of economic thought: a doctrine in the 1920s". The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought. 28 (5): 811–843. doi:10.1080/09672567.2021.1908393. ISSN 0967-2567.
  7. 1 2 Dincer, Nergiz; Eichengreen, Barry; Martinez, Joan J. (2024). "Central Bank Independence: Views from History and Machine Learning". Annual Review of Economics. doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-081623-032553. ISSN 1941-1383.
  8. ↑ Baumgarten, Matthias (February 2012). The Role of Central Bank Independence in a World of Capital Mobility. GRIN Verlag. ISBN 978-3-656-11414-7.
  9. ↑ Knill, Christoph (31 October 2013). Cross-national Policy Convergence: Concepts, Causes and Empirical Findings. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-317-98356-9.
  10. ↑ Singleton, John (25 March 2016). Economic and Natural Disasters since 1900: A Comparative History. Edward Elgar Publishing. ISBN 978-1-78254-735-8.
  11. ↑ Huret, Romain; Lichtenstein, Nelson; Vinel, Jean-Christian (11 December 2020). Capitalism Contested: The New Deal and Its Legacies. University of Pennsylvania Press. ISBN 978-0-8122-9762-1.
  12. ↑ Chaudhuri, Ranajoy Ray (15 October 2016). The Changing Face of American Banking: Deregulation, Reregulation, and the Global Financial System. Springer. ISBN 978-1-137-36121-9.
  13. ↑ Kwarteng, Kwasi (27 May 2014). War and Gold: A Five-Hundred-Year History of Empires, Adventures, and Debt. PublicAffairs. ISBN 978-1-61039-196-2.
  14. ↑ James, Harold (19 November 2012). Making the European Monetary Union. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-06808-7.
  15. ↑ Conti-Brown, Peter (10 October 2017). The Power and Independence of the Federal Reserve. Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-17838-7.
  16. ↑ Warjiyo, Perry; Juhro, Solikin M. (25 July 2019). Central Bank Policy: Theory and Practice. Emerald Group Publishing. ISBN 978-1-78973-753-0.
  17. ↑ Giordano, Francesco; Persaud, Sharda (18 October 2013). The Political Economy of Monetary Union: Towards the Euro. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-136-22416-4.
  18. ↑ Quaglia, Lucia (11 December 2007). Central Banking Governance in the European Union: A Comparative Analysis. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-134-09020-4.
  19. ↑ Chryssogelos, Angelos; Hawkins, Eliza Tanner; Hawkins, Kirk A.; Littvay, Levente; Wiesehomeier, Nina (7 November 2024). The Ideational Approach to Populism, Volume II: Consequences and Mitigation. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-1-040-14918-8.
  20. ↑ Eaton, James W.; Mishkin, Frederic S. (1993). Readings for the Economics of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets. HarperCollins. ISBN 978-0-673-52286-3.
  21. ↑ Addison, Tony; Roe, Alan (2018). Extractive Industries: The Management of Resources as a Driver of Sustainable Development. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-881736-9.
  22. ↑ Central Bank Independence, Accountability, and Transparency. 15 July 2009. doi:10.5089/9780230201071.071. ISBN 9780230201071.
  23. ↑ Buckley, Ross P.; Avgouleas, Emilios; Arner, Douglas W. (11 March 2016). Reconceptualising Global Finance and its Regulation. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-107-10093-0.
  24. ↑ Cobham, David; Dibeh, Ghassan (13 January 2009). Monetary Policy and Central Banking in the Middle East and North Africa. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-134-02376-9.
  25. ↑ Guillaume, Vallet; Sylvio, Kappes; Louis-Philippe, Rochon (18 August 2022). Central Banking, Monetary Policy and Social Responsibility. Edward Elgar Publishing. ISBN 978-1-80037-223-8.
  26. ↑ Byrialsen, Mikael Randrup; Raza, Hamid; Olesen, Finn (27 October 2022). Macroeconomic Modelling, Economic Policy and Methodology: Economics at the Edge. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-1-000-73607-6.
  27. ↑ Haan, Jakob De (10 September 2012). The History of the Bundesbank: Lessons for the European Central Bank. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-134-60413-5.
  28. 1 2 3 Warjiyo, Perry; Juhro, Solikin M. (25 July 2019). Central Bank Policy: Theory and Practice. Emerald Group Publishing. ISBN 978-1-78973-751-6.
  29. ↑ Warjiyo, Perry; Juhro, Solikin M. (25 July 2019). Central Bank Policy: Theory and Practice. Emerald Group Publishing. ISBN 978-1-78973-751-6.
  30. ↑ Cobham, David; Dibeh, Ghassan (13 January 2009). Monetary Policy and Central Banking in the Middle East and North Africa. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-134-02376-9.
  31. ↑ Kleineman, Jan (18 October 2021). Central Bank Independence: The Economic Foundations, the Constitutional Implications and Democratic Accountability. BRILL. ISBN 978-90-04-48130-5.
  32. ↑ Adrian, Mr Tobias; Khan, Mr Ashraf; Menand, Lev (23 February 2024). A New Measure of Central Bank Independence. International Monetary Fund. ISBN 979-8-4002-6841-0.
  33. ↑ Yağcı, Mustafa (3 September 2020). The Political Economy of Central Banking in Emerging Economies. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-000-16477-0.
  34. ↑ Warjiyo, Perry; Juhro, Solikin M. (25 July 2019). Central Bank Policy: Theory and Practice. Emerald Group Publishing. ISBN 978-1-78973-753-0.
  35. ↑ Tshiani, N. (14 August 2008). Building Credible Central Banks: Policy Lessons For Emerging Economies. Springer. ISBN 978-0-230-59425-8.
  36. ↑ Conti-Brown, Peter; Lastra, Rosa Maria. Research Handbook on Central Banking. Edward Elgar Publishing. ISBN 978-1-78471-922-7.
  37. ↑ Tognato, C. (31 October 2012). Central Bank Independence: Cultural Codes and Symbolic Performance. Springer. ISBN 978-1-137-26883-9.
  38. ↑ Conti-Brown, Peter; Lastra, Rosa Maria. Research Handbook on Central Banking. Edward Elgar Publishing. ISBN 978-1-78471-922-7.
  39. ↑ Martino, Maggetti; Fabrizio, Di Mascio; Alessandro, Natalini (12 August 2022). Handbook of Regulatory Authorities. Edward Elgar Publishing. ISBN 978-1-83910-899-0.
  40. ↑ Cobb, Wendy N. Whitman (27 March 2023). Political Science Today. CQ Press. ISBN 978-1-0718-4459-5.
  41. ↑ Minkkinen, Petri; Patomäki, Heikki (6 December 2012). The Politics of Economic and Monetary Union. Springer Science & Business Media. ISBN 978-1-4615-6085-2.
  42. ↑ Humpage, Owen F. (5 March 2015). Current Federal Reserve Policy Under the Lens of Economic History. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-107-09909-8.
  43. ↑ Hallett, Andrew J. Hughes; Mooslechner, Peter; Schürz, Martin (29 June 2013). Challenges for Economic Policy Coordination within European Monetary Union. Springer Science & Business Media. ISBN 978-1-4757-4738-6.
  44. ↑ Oatley, Thomas; Winecoff, W. Kindred (27 June 2014). Handbook of the International Political Economy of Monetary Relations. Edward Elgar Publishing. ISBN 978-0-85793-837-4.
  45. ↑ Moloney, Niamh; Ferran, Eilís; Payne, Jennifer (27 August 2015). The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation. OUP Oxford. ISBN 978-0-19-151087-8.
  46. ↑ Maguze, Tracy C. (11 January 2024). The Governance of Macroprudential Policy: How to Build Regulatory Legitimacy Through a Social Justice Approach. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-1-5099-6840-4.
  47. ↑ Cargill, Thomas F. (6 October 2017). The Financial System, Financial Regulation and Central Bank Policy. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-107-03567-6.
  48. ↑ Cargill, Thomas F. (6 October 2017). The Financial System, Financial Regulation and Central Bank Policy. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-108-20612-9.
  49. ↑ Kaltenthaler, Karl (17 August 2006). Policymaking in the European Central Bank: The Masters of Europe's Money. Bloomsbury Publishing PLC. ISBN 978-0-7425-5367-5.
  50. ↑ Chadha, Jagjit S.; Crystal, Alec; Pearlman, Joe; Smith, Peter; Wright, Stephen (28 July 2016). The UK Economy in the Long Expansion and its Aftermath. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-316-65431-6.
  51. ↑ Wei, Lingling (8 December 2021). "Beijing Reins In China's Central Bank". The Wall Street Journal. ISSN 0099-9660. Retrieved 31 August 2023. Beijing has little tolerance for any talk of central-bank independence; the monetary authority, just like any other part of the government, answers to the party.
  52. ↑ Abor, Joshua Yindenaba; Quartey, Peter; Nellis, Joseph G.; Subramanian, Lakshmy (7 November 2024). Monetary Economics in Emerging and Developing Countries. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-1-040-17588-0.
  53. ↑ Gersbach, Hans; Hahn, Volker (August 2009). "Voting Transparency in a Monetary Union". Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. 41 (5): 831–853. doi:10.1111/j.1538-4616.2009.00235.x.
  54. ↑ Holton, Robert (6 March 2012). Global Finance. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-136-80809-8.
  55. ↑ Massó, Matilde (2 October 2023). Contested Money: Toward a New Social Contract. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-1-000-96952-8.
  56. ↑ Beker, Victor A. (15 August 2025). Real World Economics: Methodological, Theoretical, and Critical Issues. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-1-040-40872-8.
  57. ↑ Dombret, Andreas R.; Lucius, Otto (1 January 2013). Stability of the Financial System: Illusion Or Feasible Concept?. Edward Elgar Publishing. ISBN 978-1-78254-784-6.
  58. ↑ Yağcı, Mustafa (3 September 2020). The Political Economy of Central Banking in Emerging Economies. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-000-16477-0.
  59. ↑ Bayoumi, Tamim (19 September 2017). Unfinished Business: The Unexplored Causes of the Financial Crisis and the Lessons Yet to be Learned. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-23183-0.
  60. ↑ Manger-Nestler, Cornelia; Gentzsch, Markus (29 May 2021). Democratic Legitimation of Central Bank Independence in the European Union. Springer Nature. ISBN 978-3-030-75115-9.
  61. ↑ Wehner, Burkhard (28 October 2021). Towards the Next Revolution in Central Banking: A Radical Framework for Monetary Policy. Springer Nature. ISBN 978-3-030-85766-0.
  62. ↑ Aynsley, Kellow; Tony, Porter; Karsten, Ronit (27 August 2021). Handbook of Business and Public Policy. Edward Elgar Publishing. ISBN 978-1-78897-912-2.
  63. ↑ Dyson, Kenneth; Marcussen, Martin (30 July 2009). Central Banks in the Age of the Euro: Europeanization, Convergence, and Power. OUP Oxford. ISBN 978-0-19-157042-1.
  64. ↑ Warjiyo, Perry; Juhro, Solikin M. (22 January 2022). Central Bank Policy Mix: Issues, Challenges, and Policy Responses: Handbook of Central Banking Studies. Springer Nature. ISBN 978-981-16-6827-2.
  65. ↑ Haberman, Maggie (16 July 2025). "Trump Has Drafted Letter to Fire Fed Chair and Asked Republicans if He Should". The New York Times.
  66. ↑ Schwartz, Brian (16 July 2025). "Trump Denies He Is Planning to Attempt to Fire Powell". Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 16 July 2025.